The venture capital world, and much of the tech industry,
exhibits a deep fascination with TAM – Total Addressable Market. It’s often a
pivotal slide in a pitch deck, the number that supposedly defines the
stratosphere of potential. The logic is seductive: a bigger market implies a
bigger prize. VCs, by their nature, are hunting for the outlier, the
fund-returner, the company that can achieve massive scale. A large TAM,
theoretically, provides the ocean in which such a whale can grow.
Observing the venture capital sphere provides an education
in this mindset. The constant pressure appears to be to find businesses that
can achieve “unicorn” status or command a significant slice of a
multi-billion-dollar pie. One frequently observes good, solid businesses –
profitable, serving their customers well, possessing deep domain expertise –
being dismissed because their “addressable market” isn’t deemed sufficiently
vast. The focus invariably lands on the theoretical ceiling, often at the expense
of the actual floor and the strength of the foundations.
Such an approach can appear to ignore a fundamental reality:
that many of the most durable, profitable enterprises are not those flailing in
a red ocean of immense competition, but those that have achieved a quiet,
defensible dominance in a well-defined, often unglamorous, niche.
Consider, for instance, the not-uncommon story of a “hot”
company, lauded for its pursuit of an enormous, ill-defined consumer market.
Such companies often raise vast sums on the promise of capturing this TAM. The
result can be a diffuse focus, a product roadmap that tries to be all things to
all people, and a marketing spend that evaporates into the ether. They aim for
everything and may capture nothing of substance, eventually succumbing to
intense competition and their own lack of a defensible core. The TAM might be
huge, but their share of it, and their ability to profitably serve any segment
of it, can prove negligible.
Contrast this with the kind of Vertical Market Software
(VMS) business we seek at Constellation. Typically, these are founded by
individuals with an "earned secret" – a deep, almost
intuitive understanding of a specific industry’s unique workflows, regulatory
requirements, and pain points. Their software isn't generic; it's
mission-critical plumbing for their particular vertical – be it library
management, marine operations, or public transit scheduling. The TAM for any
single VMS business, viewed in isolation, might look modest, even unappealing,
to a VC chasing a decacorn. But within that boundary, these businesses are
often indispensable. Their customers are sticky, not because of flashy
marketing, but because the software is deeply embedded, reliable, and tailored.
Switching costs are high, not just financially, but in terms of operational
disruption and retraining.
This fundamental observation – that deep, defensible niches
are often more valuable and sustainable than a tenuous foothold in a vast
market – is the bedrock of Constellation. We are not in the business of chasing
TAM. We are in the business of acquiring and permanently holding companies that
are leaders, or have the clear potential to be leaders, in their specific
vertical markets.
Why does this contrarian approach work?
- Focus
and Expertise: Niche dominance allows for an almost fanatical focus.
Resources aren't spread thin; they're concentrated on understanding and
serving a specific customer set with unparalleled depth. This cultivates
the "earned secrets" that are so hard for generalists to
replicate.
- Defensible
Moats: Mission-critical, specialized software in a niche creates high
switching costs and deep customer loyalty. The moat isn't built on brand
spend, but on irreplaceability.
- Rational
Competition: While no market is without competition, well-defined VMS
niches often feature a more rational competitive landscape than sprawling
horizontal markets where dozens of heavily-funded players are burning cash
for market share.
- Profitability:
Because of their indispensability and often lower direct competitive
intensity, established VMS leaders tend to be inherently more profitable
and generate consistent cash flow.
- Sustainable
Growth: Growth in these niches often comes from deepening penetration
within the existing customer base (cross-selling relevant add-on modules,
for instance), gradual market share gains from less focused competitors,
or acquiring smaller, complementary players within the same vertical. It's
typically more measured, but also more sustainable, than explosive,
TAM-driven growth.
The TAM trap, then, is the allure of vastness over the
substance of defensible, profitable dominance. It’s the temptation to believe
that a bigger potential market automatically translates to a better business,
ignoring the brutal realities of execution, competition, and the difficulty of
achieving genuine customer lock-in when your focus is a mile wide and an inch
deep.
Constellation's model – permanent ownership of VMS leaders, managed with
significant autonomy by people who understand their specific niche – allows
these businesses to thrive. They are not under pressure to contort themselves
to fit a VC’s TAM-centric exit strategy. They can focus on serving their
customers, refining their products, and generating sustainable cash flow over
the very long term. Our decentralized structure ensures that the BU managers,
who live and breathe their verticals, are empowered to make decisions based on
the realities of their specific market, not a generic, top-down mandate to
chase an abstract market size.
Our primary challenge is not a lack of large markets to chase, but a scarcity of truly excellent, niche-dominant VMS businesses available at sensible valuations that meet our disciplined investment criteria. Finding them, acquiring them, and then letting them continue to do what they do best, without the distraction of the TAM siren song, is our core endeavor. It's a different game, played for different stakes, over a much longer horizon.